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I. INTRODUCTION
IN the mid-1990s,1 Myriad Genetics, Inc. (Myriad) discovered the lo-cation and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) sequence of the BRCA1and BRCA2 genes.2 These two genes remain critically important in
the field of cancer research, principally because individuals with genetic
mutations in either gene live with a drastically heightened predisposition
to breast cancer and ovarian cancer.3 The National Cancer Institute re-
ports that approximately 12 percent of women in the general population
will develop breast cancer during their lifetimes and approximately 1.4
percent of women will develop ovarian cancer.4 However, these percent-
ages shift dramatically if a woman has a harmful mutation in her BRCA1
or BRCA2 genes. Recent studies estimate that 55 to 65 percent of women
who carry a harmful BRCA1 mutation and about 45 percent of women
with a harmful BRCA2 mutation will develop breast cancer by the age of
seventy.5 The numbers increase similarly for ovarian cancer—about 39
percent of women carrying a harmful BRCA1 mutation and 11 to 17 per-
1. Patent Act of 1952—Patentable Subject Matter—Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 127 HARV. L. REV. 388 (2013).
2. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2110–11
(2013) (“Myriad”).
3. See Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2112.
4. BRCA1 and BRCA2: Cancer Risk and Genetic Testing, NATIONAL CANCER INSTI-
TUTE AT THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/fact-
sheet/Risk/BRCA#r5 (last updated Jan. 22, 2014).
5. Id.; see also A. Antoniou, Average Risks of Breast and Ovarian Cancer Associated
with BRCA1 or BRCA2 Mutations Detected in Case Series Unselected for Family History: A
Combined Analysis of 22 Studies, 72 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 1117 (May 2003), available at
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cent of women with a harmful BRCA2 mutation will develop ovarian
cancer by the age of seventy.6 The gravity of these genetic mutations re-
cently rose to the forefront of the public consciousness when American
actress Angelina Jolie announced that she had undergone a preventative
double mastectomy upon learning that her BRCA1 gene carried harmful
mutations, giving her an 87 percent risk of developing breast cancer.7 As
her story illustrates, when an individual discovers the presence of a muta-
tion in one of these two genes, understanding the significance of that mu-
tation—whether the mutation is harmful or benign—is critical to that
individual’s health care decisions.
Myriad used its discovery of the BRCA genes to develop diagnostic
tests to detect whether an individual’s genes contain mutations.8 As ex-
pected, Myriad obtained a portfolio of patents related to the BRCA
genes, including patents covering the actual DNA sequences and patents
covering methods for identifying the presence of a mutation. Even after
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Association of Molecular Pathology
v. Myriad Genetics, which invalidated a subset of Myriad’s BRCA-related
patents,9 Myriad sought to aggressively maintain its control over the
breast cancer gene testing market. Myriad filed lawsuits against seven
biotechnology companies alleging infringement of patents left untouched
by the Supreme Court’s decision.10 These remaining patents contain
sixty-six method and primer claims (all related to techniques for identify-
ing harmful DNA mutations).11
With the recent announcement12 that Myriad has settled these infringe-
ment suits, allowing each competitor to sell the allegedly-infringing gene
testing kits,13 it may appear that the fight to end exclusive gene testing
services is over. In the broader realm of patents on diagnostic testing
methods, however, the battle may be just beginning. Method claims on
diagnostic testing, including genetic testing, remain viable despite recent
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1180265/pdf/AJHGv72p1117.pdf (compiling
estimates).
6. BRCA1 and BRCA2: Cancer Risk and Genetic Testing, NATIONAL CANCER INSTI-
TUTE AT THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/fact-
sheet/Risk/BRCA#r5 (last updated Jan. 22, 2014).
7. Angelina Jolie, Op-Ed., My Medical Choice, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2013), http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/05/14/opinion/my-medical-choice.html?_r=0. More recently, Ms.
Jolie Pitt wrote about her subsequent decision to undergo further preventative surgery due
to her uniquely heightened risk of developing ovarian cancer. Angelina Jolie Pitt, Op-Ed.,
Angelina Jolie Pitt: Diary of a Surgery, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1LQT
who.
8. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2112–13.
9. See generally Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (holding that isolated segments of DNA are
not patentable subject matter).
10. See generally John T. Aquino, Myriad, GeneDx Settle Patent Dispute Over BRCA
Screening, Ending Litigation, BLOOMBERG BNA LIFE SCIENCES LAW & INDUSTRY REPORT
(Feb. 20, 2015) (discussing the history of Myriad’s post-Supreme Court decision litigation).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See id.; see also, e.g., Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice at 1, Univ. of Utah
Research Found. v. GeneDx, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-00954-RJS (D. Utah Feb. 13, 2015) (parties
agreeing to dismissal of the suit with prejudice).
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court decisions regarding the unpatentability of isolated DNA se-
quences.14 The data obtained from the exclusive use of these patented
method claims remains both important to individuals seeking to under-
stand the implications of their test results and invaluable to the future of
personalized medicine. To put it concisely, “[i]nterpreting the clinical sig-
nificance of genomic information depends on broad access to DNA se-
quence variants and clinical information about [the individuals] tested.”15
For most patients, the results of BRCA gene testing are readily discern-
ible—either their genes match the normal, innocuous gene sequence, or
their genes harbor a clearly harmful mutation.16 For some patients, how-
ever, the effect of the mutations in their BRCA genes cannot be deter-
mined—their genes contain variants of unknown significance (VUS).17
Myriad, through its patent-conferred role as the exclusive testing labora-
tory for BRCA gene testing, created a database full of VUS data.18 Its
vast database “relates variants of uncertain significance to phenotype, de-
tails their frequency in various populations and includes genetic studies
on patient families.”19 This wealth of information enables Myriad to ana-
lyze an individual’s test results and return a result of “variant of unknown
significance” in just 3 percent of cases. In contrast, other genetic testing
companies return the dreaded result of “variant of unknown significance”
in 20 to 30 percent of cases.20 For individuals living in fear of an increased
risk of cancer due to the presence of a mutation with unknown signifi-
cance, this ability to provide greater certainty regarding the significance
of test results is critical.
While Myriad’s recent settlement negotiations have allowed other com-
panies to provide BRCA gene testing to determine the presence of muta-
tions,21 those companies do not possess the data required to properly
interpret those test results. As such, Myriad’s monopoly persists. Like-
wise, similar monopolies may soon emerge as other companies with ex-
clusive diagnostic testing services begin to maintain similar databases. As
some scholars have noted, “[a]s personalized medicine continues to grow
and the market for personal health risk prediction expands, more compa-
nies will create proprietary databases containing information about genes
and other biomarkers.”22
14. See infra Part III.B.
15. Robert Cook-Deegan et al., The Next Controversy in Genetic Testing: Clinical Data







21. See Aquino, supra note 10.
22. John M. Conley et al., Myriad After Myriad: The Proprietary Data Dilemma, 15
N.C. J. L. & TECH. 597, 600 (2014).
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A. THE EMERGING PROPRIETARY DATABASE ISSUE
When a company’s patents expire, the company’s rightful, patent-facili-
tated monopoly should end. However, in this information age, a new
problem has arisen: the data obtained through the use of patented diag-
nostic method claims has now become more valuable than the patented
claims themselves.23 Through November 2004, Myriad was a “major con-
tributor to public databases of BRCA mutations,”24 contributing its data
to the Breast Cancer Information Core (the largest database for BRCA
mutation information).25 Since November 25, 2004, however, Myriad has
kept a tight handle on its data set, retaining its important data as proprie-
tary.26 Thus, Myriad has entrenched itself as the company able to produce
the most meaningful interpretation of the significance of an individual’s
genetic mutations.27
The issues surrounding Myriad’s vast database of genetic information
are not unexpected. In fact, amici in support of both parties (and of
neither party) identified this very issue in amicus briefs submitted to the
Supreme Court in Myriad.28 Although not unexpected, the results are
alarming. As one amici noted, if doctors and researchers could access the
vast set of data held by Myriad, they could more fully understand the
“universe” of BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations and their effect on breast
and ovarian cancer.29 Instead, “[t]he consequence . . . is a broader mo-
nopoly on information that patients and their physicians may obtain
about the contents of an individual’s own DNA, including the patient’s
own heightened risks of life-threatening disease.”30
At least one court has expressed an aversion to Myriad’s conduct.31 A
federal district court recognized that, by hoarding its vast database, Myr-
iad “distorts rather than serves the patent system’s goal of public disclo-
sure in exchange for exclusive rights. In this way, Myriad has chosen a
23. Monya Baker, Policy Paper: Myriad Turns Cancer Genetic Data into Trade Secrets,
NATURE NEWS BLOG (Oct. 31, 2012, 11:14 PM), http://blogs.nature.com/news/2012/10/pol-
icy-paper-myriad-turns-cancer-genetic-data-into-trade-secrets.html (“[T]he BRCA muta-
tion data Myriad has collected is becoming more valuable than the original patents.”).
24. Brief of Amici Curiae Christopher M. Holman and Robert Cook-Deegan in Sup-
port of Neither Party at 27, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct.
2107 (2013) (No. 12-398), 2010 WL 4853323.
25. Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 15.
26. Brief of Amici Curiae Christopher M. Holman and Robert Cook-Deegan in Sup-
port of Neither Party, supra note 24, at 27.
27. Baker, supra note 23.
28. See Brief of Intellectual Property Owners Association as Amicus Curiae in Sup-
port of Respondents at 29, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct.
2107 (2013)  (No. 12-398), 2013 WL 1122810; Brief of Genformatic LLC as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Petitioners at 23 n.23, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133
S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398), 2013 WL 417735; Brief of Amici Curiae Christopher M.
Holman and Robert Cook-Deegan in Support of Neither Party, supra note 24, at 27.
29. Brief of Kaiser Permanente as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 8, Ass’n
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013)  (No. 12-398), 2012 WL
122280.
30. Id. at 8.
31. See In re BRCA1-, BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litig., 3 F. Supp.
3d 1213, 1276 (D. Utah 2014).
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commercial path that turns much of our patent system policy on its
head.”32 This Comment addresses possible responses—rooted in patent
law, antitrust law, and public policy—to curb the effects of such conduct.
B. OVERVIEW OF THIS COMMENT
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of the academic scholar-
ship related to proprietary databases of genetic mutation data. Part III
reviews the current state of the law as it relates to patents on DNA se-
quences and diagnostic testing methods, including gene testing. Specifi-
cally, Part III.B emphasizes why this Comment will remain relevant in the
foreseeable future. As personalized medicine rises to the forefront of
medical research, patents on diagnostic methods—though more difficult
to obtain than in previous years—will continue to thrive. Part IV dis-
cusses the possibility of Myriad and other similarly-situated companies
maintaining their proprietary databases through trade secret protection.
Part V analyzes potential avenues for preventing the development of pro-
prietary databases during the term of a patent. Part VI then evaluates the
viability of restricting such monopolistic practices through reliance on the
federal antitrust laws. Finally, Part VII suggests alternative solutions for
curbing the impact of proprietary databases of genetic information. Al-
though significant privacy concerns related to broad access to genetic
data exist, a discussion of such an important, in-depth topic is beyond the
scope of this Comment.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Although prior to the Myriad decision many scholars analyzed the
merits of whether isolated DNA should be patentable,33 few scholars
have analyzed the emerging issues surrounding proprietary databases of
genetic information from a legal perspective.
Dr. Barbara Evans, one of the leading scholars to address this issue,
penned the most in-depth article to date on the subject of Myriad’s pro-
prietary database.34 In her article, Dr. Evans provided a summary of the
regulatory principles that surround this issue and found that the “genetic
testing industry has a void where an economic regulatory framework
needs to be.”35 Aside from the helpful regulatory discussion, Dr. Evans
also offered a brief analysis of how federal antitrust principles may relate
to the proprietary data dilemma.36 She ultimately concluded, however,
that “[t]here is no way to predict”37 the viability of an antitrust counter-
claim after the Supreme Court’s decision in Verizon Communications v.
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Laurie L. Hill, The Race to Patent the Genome: Free Riders, Hold Ups,
and the Future of Medical Breakthroughs, 11 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 221 (2003).
34. See generally Barbara J. Evans, Economic Regulation of Next-Generation Sequenc-
ing, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 51 (2014).
35. Id. at 55.
36. Id. at 58–64.
37. Id. at 61.
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Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko.38
Also at the forefront of scholarship on this issue are Dr. John Conley,
Dr. Robert Cook-Deegan, and Dr. Gabriel La´zaro-Mun˜oz.39 In their re-
cent article, the authors emphasized the importance of Myriad’s “ace up
its sleeve”—that its “unparalleled array of data correlating gene muta-
tions with health outcomes, family histories, and other phenotypic factors
gives it a unique ability to interpret BRCA gene test results, especially
those that yield ambiguous findings, or variants of unknown signifi-
cance.”40 The authors provided context for the discussion by explain-
ingthe extent to which Myriad relies on its proprietary database. In 2012,
Myriad opened a new testing laboratory in Germany.41 The authors spec-
ulated that Myriad’s confidence in opening such a facility was based not
on Myriad’s ability to enforce its patents in Europe,42 but largely on Myr-
iad’s “other competitive advantages” obtained through access to its volu-
minous proprietary database.43 Regarding relevant legal principles, the
authors briefly noted that such a database could be afforded trade secret
protection.44
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF PATENT LAW AS
RELATED TO GENETICS
The much-discussed case of Association of Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics appeared to sound the death knell for the prospect of
gene patenting—and in some ways it did.45 After Myriad, companies can-
not patent isolated DNA sequences.46 However, sequences of comple-
mentary DNA (cDNA) remain patentable.47
Prior to the Court’s Myriad decision,48 the United States Patent and
38. See generally Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398 (2004).
39. See generally Conley et al., supra note 22.
40. Id. at 599–600.
41. Conley et al., supra note 22, at 612 (citing Myriad Genetics Opens Molecular Diag-
nostic Testing Lab in Munich, Germany, BIOM NEWS (Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.bio-m
.org/en/news/myriad-genetics-opens-molecular-diagnostic-testing-lab-in-munich-germany
.html).
42. John M. Conley et al., How Will Myriad Respond to the Next Generation of BRCA
Testing?, GENOMICS LAW REPORT (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.genomicslawreport.com/in-
dex.php/2011/03/01/how-will-myriad-respond-to-the-next-generation-of-brca-testing (not-
ing that the chances for Myriad to succeed in enforcing its patents in Europe are
“somewhere between slim and none”).
43. Conley et al., supra note 22, at 612 & n.73 (quoting Myriad CEO Peter Meldrum,
as quoted in John M. Conley, Dan Vorhaus & Robert Cook-Deegan, How Will Myriad
Respond to the Next Generation of BRCA Testing?, GENOMICS LAW REPORT (Mar. 1,
2011), http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2011/03/01/how-will-myriad-respond-
to-the-next-generation-of-brca-testing/).
44. Conley et al., supra note 22, at 616–17.
45. See generally Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2107 (2013) (“Myriad”).
46. Id. at 2120.
47. Id. at 2119.
48. See generally id.
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Trademark Office (USPTO) had issued thousands of gene patents.49 Af-
ter Myriad, which held that isolated DNA is not patent eligible, many of
those patents may be wholly or partially invalid.50 However, Myriad did
not address the patentability of diagnostic method claims.51 The following
two sections discuss the patentability of composition of matter claims and
method claims related to DNA after Myriad.
A. COMPOSITION OF MATTER CLAIMS: ISOLATED DNA IS NOT
PATENTABLE, BUT COMPLEMENTARY DNA IS PATENTABLE
IN SOME INSTANCES
At this point in time, the law regarding composition of matter claims
directed to DNA—patents that claim the actual DNA sequences—is
fairly clear. As the Supreme Court noted in Myriad, the discovery of a
law of nature, however “groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant”52
it may be, is insufficient to satisfy the subject matter patentability require-
ments of 35 U.S.C. § 101.53 Thus, the Court held that isolated segments of
DNA are not patentable because they are merely “products of nature.”54
Complementary DNA (cDNA)—DNA that has been transcribed to
mRNA, has had its introns spliced out, and has been transcribed back
into DNA—however, remains patentable under the Court’s analysis.55
The Court did not consider cDNA to be a “product of nature” because
cDNA rarely, if ever, occurs naturally.56 Yet, according to the Court’s
decision, in some circumstances even cDNA may not be patent eligible
subject matter if it is “indistinguishable from natural DNA” due to its
short length that mirrors a section of DNA without introns.57
B. DIAGNOSTIC METHOD CLAIMS: A CLAIM MUST PRACTICALLY
APPLY THE RECITED LAW OF NATURE
TO BE PATENT ELIGIBLE
In its Myriad decision, the Court specifically noted that no method
claims (such as a method for identifying the presence of a genetic muta-
49. Christopher Beauchamp, Patenting Nature: A Problem of History, 16 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. 257, 259 (2013) (citing Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
50. See Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2120.
51. See id. at 2119–20.
52. Id. at 2117.
53. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.”).
54. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2120 (“[G]enes and the information they encode are not
patent eligible under § 101 simply because they have been isolated from the surrounding
genetic material.”).
55. Id. at 2112, 2119.
56. Id. at 2119 n.8 (“The possibility that an unusual and rare phenomenon might ran-
domly create a molecule similar to one created synthetically through human ingenuity does
not render a composition of matter nonpatentable.”).
57. Id. at 2119.
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tion) were before the Court.58 Thus, that decision did not alter or add to
the Court’s previous decision regarding method claims in Mayo Collabo-
rative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories.59 In Mayo, the Court held
that claims that merely inform a physician of a recently discovered law of
nature are not patent eligible subject matter.60 Such natural phenomena
are the “‘basic tools of scientific and technological work’”61 and “monop-
olization of those tools through the grant of a patent might tend to im-
pede innovation more than it would tend to promote it.”62 Thus, the
Court held that to be patent eligible, a method claim must demonstrate
some practical application—the claim cannot be a law of nature crafted
artfully into the form of a method claim.63 As the Court aptly explained,
Archimedes would not have been able to patent his principle of flotation
by simply drafting a method claim directing boat-builders to refer to the
principle of flotation to determine if an object would float.64 The Court
focused on whether the steps of the claimed method, other than the steps
reciting the law of nature, were “in context obvious, already in use, or
purely conventional.”65 In analyzing the steps of the claimed method in
Mayo, the Court found that the claimed steps “add[ed] nothing specific to
the laws of nature other than what [was] well-understood, routine, con-
ventional activity, previously engaged in by those in the field.”66
The Mayo Court, however, affirmed that some diagnostic method
claims are still patent eligible subject matter. The Court first pointed to its
earlier decision in Diamond v. Diehr.67 In Diehr, the Court found patent-
able a method for molding rubber into various products.68 The claimed
method in Diehr involved “(1) continuously monitoring the temperature
on the inside of the mold, (2) feeding the resulting numbers into a com-
puter, which would use the Arrhenius equation to continuously recalcu-
late the mold-opening time, and (3) configuring the computer so that at
the appropriate moment it would signal ‘a device’ to open the press.”69
The Diehr Court recognized that the applicant had not attempted to pat-
ent the Arrhenius equation, but instead focused on implementing that
mathematical algorithm to achieve a larger, practical application.70 The
Court noted that the inventors “[did] not seek to pre-empt the use of that
58. Id.
59. See generally Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289
(2012).
60. Id. at 1298.
61. Id. at 1293 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1297 (“If a law of nature is not patentable, then neither is a process reciting a
law of nature, unless that process has additional features that provide practical assurance
that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the law of nature
itself.”).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1299.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1298. See generally Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
68. See generally Diehr, 450 U.S. 175.
69. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298 (summarizing the claimed process in Diehr).
70. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187.
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equation. Rather, they [sought] only to foreclose from others the use of
that equation in conjunction with all of the other steps in their claimed
process.”71 This, according to the Mayo Court, “transformed the process
into an inventive application of the formula.”72
Similar to the decision in Diehr, but more appropriate for a discussion
of medical diagnostics, is the Federal Circuit’s decision in Classen Immu-
notherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC.73 The claimed method in that case in-
volved comparing multiple human immunization schedules, identifying
the schedule that would produce the lowest risk for an individual, and
then immunizing the individual based on that lower risk schedule.74 In
finding the claimed method patentable, the Federal Circuit cited the logic
of the Diehr Court.75 This sort of method claim—applying a newly dis-
covered law of nature in a practical, yet broad manner—may serve as a
useful model for future diagnostic method claim drafting.
1. Recent Case Law Regarding Method Claims on Diagnostic Gene
Testing
In December 2014, the Federal Circuit addressed two of Myriad’s
method claims related to gene testing and found both claims invalid as
unpatentable subject matter.76 Both claims involved methods for compar-
ing an individual’s BRCA gene sequences with the wild-type (normal, not
mutated) BRCA sequence.77 Although the defendant in the case, Ambry
Genetics Corporation, argued that the method claims should be invali-
dated under the rationale of Mayo, the Federal Circuit refused to address
the claims under the Mayo Court’s “law of nature” analysis.78 Instead,
the court found the claims invalid as an attempt to patent an “abstract
idea.”79 Thus, the court’s analysis employed the two-step approach used
by the Supreme Court in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International80 to ana-
lyze whether patents that claim abstract ideas are patentable.81 First, the
court determined that the claims were directed to a patent-ineligible con-
cept—here, the “abstract idea of comparing BRCA sequences and deter-
mining the existence of alterations.”82 Second, the court examined
whether the claims presented an additional “inventive concept” such that
the additional concept sufficed to “transform the nature of the claim into
71. Id.
72. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1299.
73. See generally Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1060
(Fed. Cir. 2011).
74. Id. at 1060–61.
75. Id. at 1064.
76. In re BRCA1- & BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litig., 774 F.3d
755, 762 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“In re BRCA”).
77. Id. at 761–62 (reproducing claim language).
78. Id. at 762.
79. Id.
80. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014) (citing Mayo Col-
laborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1296–97 (2012)).
81. In re BRCA, 774 F.3d at 763.
82. Id.
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a patent-eligible application.”83 In finding that the claims remained ineli-
gible under step two of this analysis, the Federal Circuit used language
reminiscent of the language in Mayo.84 Specifically, the court noted that
the additional claim elements did “nothing more than spell out what prac-
titioners already knew—how to compare gene sequences using routine,
ordinary techniques. . . . [T]hose comparison techniques were the well-
understood, routine, and conventional techniques that a scientist would
have thought of when instructed to compare two gene sequences.”85 Af-
ter the Federal Circuit’s decision, it is clear that diagnostic method claims
that merely compare DNA sequences will not be patentable subject mat-
ter. If, however, the claims go beyond mere comparison and include an
additional “inventive concept,” the claims may still be eligible for patent
protection.
2. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Guidelines After Mayo and
Myriad
To further confirm the continued viability of diagnostic method claims,
the USPTO recently published an updated set of guidance documents for
its Patent Examining Corps (the individuals who grant or deny patent
applications) to use when evaluating whether a claimed process is patent-
able under 35 U.S.C. § 101.86 The quick reference document outlines a
two-step process for determining whether a claim contains patent eligible
subject matter.87 First, an Examiner asks whether the claim is directed to
one of the four statutory subject matter categories: process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter.88 Second, the Examiner invokes
the two-part inquiry from Alice Corp. by first asking if the claim is di-
rected to  a “judicial exception” to patentability (a law of nature, a natu-
ral phenomenon, or an abstract idea).89 If so, the Examiner then asks
“whether any element, or combination of elements, in the claim is suffi-
cient to ensure that the claim as a whole amounts to significantly more
than the judicial exception.”90 Additional guidance documents provide
examples to illustrate when a claim is “significantly more” than a law of
nature or an abstract idea.91 The analytical process outlined in the
USPTO’s guidance documents closely resembles the logic used by the
Federal Circuit in its December 2014 decision invalidating Myriad’s
83. Id.
84. Id. at 764.
85. Id.
86. See generally USPTO, 2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility,
79 Fed. Reg. 74,619 (Dec. 16, 2014) (request for comments); USPTO, “2014 Interim Eligi-
bility Guidance Quick Reference Sheet” (Dec. 2014) (“USPTO Quick Reference
Document”).
87. Id. at 1.
88. Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 101 (listing the categories of patentable subject matter).
89. USPTO Quick Reference Document, supra note 86, at 1.
90. Id. (emphasis in original).
91. See USPTO, Nature-Based Product Examples (Dec. 16, 2014); USPTO, Abstract
Idea Examples (Jan. 27, 2015).
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method claims. Either analysis—based on judicial guidance or USPTO
guidance—leaves room for patent eligible diagnostic method claims if the
claims include an “inventive concept”92 or something “significantly
more.”93 Thus, we should continue to see patent applications for diagnos-
tic method claims, including diagnostic method claims related to gene
testing. Although the rules regarding patent eligibility under § 101 are
now more strict,94 diagnostic method claims are not historical relics.
IV. KEEPING THE DATA AS A TRADE SECRET
The VUS data obtained from Myriad’s period as the exclusive provider
of BRCA gene testing will likely be eligible for trade secret protection.
Trade secret protection falls under state law, though the vast majority95 of
states have adopted some version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
(UTSA). As such, the law of trade secrets is somewhat uniform nation-
wide. Professor Mark Lemley argues that trade secret law should be con-
sidered in the context of intellectual property law.96 He describes trade
secret protection as conferring on a “developer of new and valuable in-
formation the right to restrict others from using it, and therefore the pros-
pect of deriving supracompetitive profits from the information.”97
A. WHETHER MYRIAD’S PROPRIETARY DATABASE QUALIFIES FOR
TRADE SECRET PROTECTION
Myriad will likely be able to maintain its proprietary database as a
trade secret, at least for a period of time. The set of subject matter that
qualifies for trade secret protection is much broader than the subject mat-
ter eligible for patent protection.98 Whether something is eligible for
trade secret protection is a question of law, but one that involves a fact-
intensive inquiry.99 Three primary definitions of what constitutes a trade
secret currently exist. The traditional definition of a trade secret, found in
the Restatement (First) of Torts, defines a trade secret as “any formula,
pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one’s busi-
ness, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over
competitors who do not know or use it.”100 The definition under the Re-
statement of Unfair Competition—though not adopted by many
92. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1299 (2012).
93. USPTO Quick Reference Document, supra note 86, at 1.
94. See generally Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1289.
95. Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets As IP Rights, 61
STAN. L. REV. 311, 316 (2008).
96. See generally id.
97. Id. at 330.
98. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (limiting the classes of subject matter eligible for patent-
ability and requiring the invention to be novel and nonobvious).
99. See, e.g., AvidAir Helicopter Supply, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 663 F.3d 966, 971
(8th Cir. 2011).
100. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
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courts101—mirrors that original definition.102 It defines a trade secret as
“any information that can be used in the operation of a business or other
enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual
or potential economic advantage over others.”103 Meanwhile, the widely
adopted UTSA defines “trade secret” as:
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, de-
vice, method, technique, or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from
not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable
by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value
from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circum-
stances to maintain its secrecy.104
At least one scholar has argued that the UTSA definition of a trade
secret “was designed to re-focus attention on the character of the thing to
be protected and, thereby, limit the cases in which a successful trade se-
cret claim can be brought.”105 Yet, in determining whether something
qualifies for trade secret protection, even under the UTSA definition,
courts often look to the six factors listed in comment b to the Restate-
ment (First) of Torts § 757.106 The six factors listed are:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of the busi-
ness; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others in-
volved in the business; (3) the measures taken to guard its secrecy; (4) the
value to the business and its competitors; (5) the effort or money ex-
pended in developing the information; and (6) the ease or difficulty with
which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by
others.107
Under any of these definitions, Myriad’s database of genetic variants
will most likely qualify as a trade secret. Certainly, as discussed above,
the value of the VUS database is incomparable, as it is the only database
containing such a wealth of important genetic information. As such, the
database likely “derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known.”108 Regarding efforts to maintain se-
101. See Annemarie Bridy, Trade Secret Prices and High-Tech Devices: How Medical
Device Manufacturers Are Seeking to Sustain Profits by Propertizing Prices, 17 TEX. IN-
TELL. PROP. L.J. 187, 201 & n.76 (2009) (noting that courts rarely invoke the provisions of
the Restatement of Unfair Competition that address trade secrets).
102. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995).
103. Id.
104. U.T.S.A. § 1(4) (amended 1985).
105. Sharon K. Sandeen, A Contract by Any Other Name Is Still A Contract: Examining
the Effectiveness of Trade Secret Clauses to Protect Databases, 45 IDEA 119, 129 (2005).
106. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939); see also Bridy, supra note
101, at 201 n.74 (emphasizing the frequent reliance on the Restatement factors when apply-
ing the UTSA definition of a trade secret).
107. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
108. See U.T.S.A. § 1(4).
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crecy, Myriad has already kept its database secret since 2004.109 Consid-
ering the unique value of the database (and the success the company has
had in keeping the database secret thus far), it is likely that Myriad has in
place strong policies to maintain secrecy in the future.110 Thus the re-
quirement of secrecy under any definition will likely be satisfied.
The primary issue regarding eligibility for trade secret protection is the
requirement under the UTSA that the information not be “generally
known” and “readily ascertainable.”111 This inquiry is a question of
fact.112 With respect to databases of information being kept as trade
secrets, some courts have held that mere compilation of public informa-
tion into a database cannot qualify as a trade secret because the informa-
tion is generally known.113 Other courts, however, have found the
opposite. For example, an Indiana Court of Appeals allowed for trade
secret protection for a database of publicly available information because
“the integration of separate pieces of raw data, taken together, consti-
tutes a unique compilation which, in order to duplicate, would require a
substantial investment of time, expense, and effort.”114 When the
database contains less accessible information, a database of customer in-
formation is more likely to be protected.115 Myriad’s database would al-
most certainly fall in this second category of databases and, thus, would
qualify for trade secret protection. The information in Myriad’s database
is not a mere compilation of publicly available data, but rather a set of
individual genetic information obtained through Myriad’s time as the ex-
clusive provider of BRCA gene testing services. Thus, this information is
not “generally known” nor “readily ascertainable.”116 As discussed be-
low,117 it is possible that a comparable database could developed through
joint efforts in the research community. As the Eighth Circuit has noted,
however, “[t]he fact that information can be ultimately discerned by
others—whether through independent investigation, accidental discov-
ery, or reverse engineering—does not make it unprotectable.”118 Thus,
109. See Brief of Amici Curiae Christopher M. Holman and Robert Cook-Deegan in
Support of Neither Party, supra note 24, at 27.
110. See id.
111. U.T.S.A. § 1(4).
112. Zoecon Indus., a Div. of Zoecon Corp. v. Am. Stockman Tag Co., 713 F.2d 1174,
1179 (5th Cir. 1983).
113. See, e.g., id. at 1179 (“[A] customer list of readily ascertainable names and ad-
dresses will not be protected as a trade secret.”); see also Hamer Holding Grp., Inc. v.
Elmore, 560 N.E.2d 907, 918–19 (1990) (holding that a database of names, addresses, and
phone numbers did not qualify for trade secret protection under the Illinois Trade Secrets
Act because “[a]nyone equipped with a public telephone directory could have collected the
contact information”).
114. N. Elec. Co. v. Torma, 819 N.E.2d 417, 426 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Amoco
Production Co. v. Laird, 622 N.E.2d 912, 919 (Ind. 1993)).
115. See, e.g., Zoecon, 713 F.2d at 1176 (holding that “a memorandum containing the
names, addresses, and purchasing characteristics of a business’s customers is a trade secret
under Texas law”).
116. See U.T.S.A. § 1(4).
117. See infra Part VII.B.
118. AvidAir Helicopter Supply, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 663 F.3d 966, 973 (8th Cir.
2011).
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for the time being, Myriad’s database would likely qualify for trade secret
protection.
B. THE BENEFITS OF RELYING ON TRADE SECRET PROTECTION
To recover for trade secret misappropriation under the UTSA, a trade
secret owner must show that a trade secret existed and that the acquisi-
tion, disclosure, or use of that trade secret was improper.119 If trade se-
cret misappropriation is established, the trade secret owner may receive
injunctive relief as well as damages.120
A party may receive injunctive relief for the period of time during
which the trade secret would exist, and that time period may be extended
to account for a commercial advantage or “lead time” period.121 If, how-
ever, a court does not find complete injunctive relief appropriate, the
court may allow for use of the trade secret upon a payment of reasonable
royalties for the time period during which the trade secret would have
existed.122 The Commissioner’s Comment to the Restatement notes that
such an arrangement may be appropriate when there is an “overriding
public interest which requires the denial of a prohibitory injunction.”123
Moreover, a trade secret owner may also recover actual damages and
damages for unjust enrichment upon a showing of trade secret misappro-
priation.124 Furthermore, punitive damages may be awarded for “willful
and malicious misappropriation.”125 Monetary damages, however, typi-
cally will not be available for any time period that injunctive relief is also
granted.126
C. THE LIMITS OF RELYING ON TRADE SECRET PROTECTION
The downside of relying on trade secret protection is that proper means
exist for using and disclosing the trade secret.127 Notably, if another party
independently invents or reverse engineers the trade secret, then the
trade secret owner has no recourse against that party because no misap-
propriation has occurred.128 One of the primary limits Myriad will face
regarding trade secret protection is the possibility of independent crea-
tion by other researchers of a comparable database of VUS information.
Once such a database is created, Myriad’s trade secret protection
evaporates.
The time period for which Myriad would be able to keep its database as
a trade secret may be severely limited by the fact that other efforts are
119. See U.T.S.A. § 1(4) (defining “misappropriation”).
120. U.T.S.A. §§ 2–3.
121. See U.T.S.A. § 2(a); U.T.S.A. § 2(a) Commissioner’s Comment.
122. See U.T.S.A. § 2(b).
123. U.T.S.A. § 2 Commissioner’s Comment.
124. U.T.S.A. § 3(a).
125. U.T.S.A. § 3(b).
126. See U.T.S.A. § 3 Commissioner’s Comment.
127. See U.T.S.A. § 1 Commissioner’s Comment (listing examples of proper means).
128. See id.
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already underway to attempt to recreate the genetic mutation
database.129 For example, Pathway Genomics valiantly proclaimed its in-
tent to share all genetic mutation data with the public through the Free
the Data movement, which encourages the submission of data to ClinVar,
a public database of genetic information.130 If researchers could create a
comparable database through such efforts, it would strip Myriad of trade
secret protection for its database.131 Thus, if other companies (or the gen-
eral public) create an equivalent VUS database, Myriad would lose its de
facto monopoly. Until other researchers develop a comparable database,
however, Myriad will be able to maintain its valuable VUS database as a
trade secret.
V. EXTENDING THE SCOPE OF THE PATENT:
PATENT MISUSE
A. MYRIAD’S DATABASE OF VARIANTS OF UNKNOWN SEQUENCE IS
NOT COVERED BY ITS PATENT CLAIMS
To be sure, patent protection does not extend to the data obtained
from the use of Myriad’s patented gene testing technologies. A patent
must include “one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly
claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards
as the invention.”132 As the Federal Circuit has noted, “[i]t is a bedrock
principle of patent law that the claims of a patent define the invention to
which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.”133 Thus, the claims of
a patent identify the scope of the invention for patentability and infringe-
ment purposes.134 Claim language serves to delineate the precise “metes
and bounds” of a patent; thus, patent protection simply does not extend
to anything beyond the scope of the claims.135 As the Supreme Court has
noted, “[t]he scope of every patent is limited to the invention described in
the claims contained in it, read in the light of the specification.”136 How-
ever, a patent owner is entitled to all “uses and advantages” of the
patent.137
129. See infra Part VII.B; see also Kevin E. Noonan, Good News, Bad News and More
Inflammatory Rhetoric in Myriad Genetics Case, PATENT DOCS (June 17, 2014, 11:59 PM),
http://www.patentdocs.org/2014/06/good-news-bad-news-and-more-inflammatory-rhetoric-
in-myriad-genetics-case.html.
130. See infra Part VII.B; see also Press Release, Pathway Genomics, Pathway Ge-
nomics Announces Commitment to Free the Data Movement at NSGC Conference (Sept.
9, 2014), available at https://www.pathway.com/pathway-genomics-announces-commit-
ment-to-free-the-data-movement-at-nsgc-conference.
131. See Noonan, supra note 129.
132. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012).
133. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (internal quotations
omitted).
134. See id.
135. See Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (“It is the claims that define the metes and bounds of the patentee’s invention.”).
136. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510 (1917).
137. See, e.g., Kennicott Co. v. Holt Ice & Cold Storage Co., 230 F. 157, 161 (7th Cir.
1915).
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The method claims Myriad asserted in its post-Myriad litigation do not
claim the genetic data obtained from the use of the patented method
claims.138 Thus, the once-enforceable method claims in Myriad’s patent
did not protect the data acquired through those claims because such data
was not within the claimed scope of the invention.
Even if Myriad had attempted to patent the gathering, storage, and
analysis of the data in its vast database, it is unlikely that the database
would have qualified for patent protection. Instead, the database—and
the method of comparing a new test result with contents of the existing
database—would likely be considered abstract ideas, thus falling outside
the realm of subject matter that may be patented.139 The Federal Circuit
found a similar patent claim invalid in Content Extraction & Transmission
LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, National Association.140 In that case, the pat-
ent claimed a method for scanning paper documents, extracting certain
information from those documents, and storing that information in a
database.141 In finding the method claim invalid as an attempt to patent
an abstract idea, the court specifically emphasized that “[t]he concept of
data collection, recognition, and storage is undisputedly well-known.”142
Because the database of genetic information is not covered by the pat-
ent, an argument could be made that Myriad attempted to extend its pat-
ent beyond its intended scope by maintaining such a proprietary
database. Such an improper extension of patent scope is the hallmark of
the patent misuse defense.
B. THE PATENT MISUSE DEFENSE TO PATENT INFRINGEMENT
Patent misuse is a traditional defense that a party accused of patent
infringement may assert.143 If the accused party establishes patent mis-
use, the patent owner’s patent will be rendered unenforceable—meaning
the patent owner cannot sue to enforce its patent rights.144 As articulated
by the Federal Circuit, the essence of the patent misuse doctrine is this:
“the patentee may exploit his patent but may not ‘use it to acquire a
monopoly not embraced in the patent.’”145 The doctrine “arises from the
equitable doctrine of unclean hands, and relates generally to the use of
patent rights to obtain or to coerce an unfair commercial advantage.”146
138. U.S. Patent No. 5,753,441 (filed Jan. 5, 1996) (asserted in In re BRCA1-, BRCA2-
Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litig., 3 F. Supp. 3d 1213, 1244 (D. Utah 2014)).
139. See supra Part III.B for a discussion of patent-eligible subject matter.
140. Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n, No.
2013-1588, 2014 WL 7272219, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 23, 2014).
141. Id.
142. Id. at *3.
143. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 519
(1917) (fashioning the foundation of the patent misuse doctrine).
144. See Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(en banc).
145. Id. at 1327 (quoting Transparent–Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329
U.S. 637, 643 (1947)).
146. C.R. Bard v. M3 Sys., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“C.R. Bard”).
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Essentially, the patent misuse doctrine addresses instances where a pat-
ent owner’s actions “extend the economic effect beyond the scope of the
patent grant.”147
Despite the doctrine’s seemingly broad scope, courts have found patent
misuse in only a handful of instances, specifically noting that patent mis-
use “does not include a general notion of ‘wrongful’ use.”148 Historically,
patent misuse has been used primarily to prevent patent owners from
conditioning patent licenses on the purchase of another unpatented prod-
uct.149 The Federal Circuit, however, has continually narrowed the scope
of the doctrine.150 Moreover, Congress further limited the scope of patent
misuse in 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) by specifically listing five types of conduct
that will not be considered patent misuse.151 One important limitation
was added when Congress passed the Patent Misuse Reform Act of
1988.152 The statute now provides that conditioning a license or sale of a
patented product on purchase of a separate product is not patent misuse
unless “the patent owner has market power in the relevant market for the
patent or patented product on which the license or sale is condi-
tioned.”153 The doctrine is further limited by the narrow circumstances in
which it applies. Because patent misuse exists only as an affirmative de-
fense to patent infringement, it does not provide a cause of action against
a patent owner for alleged misuse of its patent. Thus, this doctrine only
becomes relevant during the life of a patent, when the patent owner seeks
to enforce its patent.
Although at first blush it appears obvious that collecting data from pa-
tients through the use of patented method claims, then maintaining that
database for use beyond the term of the patent “extend[s] the economic
effect beyond the scope of the patent grant,”154 courts have yet to apply
the patent misuse doctrine in this context. Because this conduct does not
mirror the typical scenarios of patent misuse, such as tying arrangements,
courts would need to evaluate this particular scenario on a case-by-case
basis. One potential avenue for a patent misuse defense might be if Myr-
iad had conditioned the sale of its BRCA genetic test on the patient’s
surrender of her genetic and personal information for use in Myriad’s
database. Although the patient would not be required to purchase an un-
patented item, as is the case in the traditional tying cases, the parallels are
self-evident.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1373.
149. See Princo, 616 F.3d at 1327.
150. Geoffrey D. Oliver, Princo v. International Trade Commission: Antitrust Law and
the Patent Misuse Doctrine Part Company, 25 SPG ANTITRUST 62, 66 (2011).
151. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2012).
152. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5).
153. Id.
154. C.R. Bard v. M3 Sys., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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C. EVEN IF ESTABLISHED, PATENT MISUSE CANNOT PREVENT
A DE FACTO MONOPOLY
Even if patent misuse could be established, no remedy is available to
the party alleging misuse.155 Rather, the only “remedy” is that the patent
owner cannot receive any remedy for infringement of its patent by
others—i.e. the patent is unenforceable—until the patent misuse is
purged.156 Thus, as long as the company with the proprietary database
continues to gather genetic information and create such a database, the
company would not be able to enforce its gene testing patent against any
infringers. As a result, competitors could enter the gene testing market
without fear of infringement litigation. Considering, however, an individ-
ual’s strong desire to understand the significance of gene testing results,
individuals would likely continue to seek out the patent owning company,
even if other companies (with small, less helpful databases) could offer
the same patented genetic test for a cheaper cost, without fear of infringe-
ment litigation. Therefore, even if patent misuse could be established, it
would not remedy the de facto monopoly retained by the patent owner.
Given the discussion among courts regarding the purpose of the patent
misuse doctrine and its distinct role in accompanying the antitrust laws, it
seems that this doctrine could be expanded to encompass issues such as
proprietary databases of information obtained from a patent monopoly.
VI. SOLUTIONS UNDER FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW
Courts have long recognized the tension between patent law and anti-
trust law.157 Yet, despite the seeming conflict, the two areas of law seek to
serve the same purpose: “encouraging innovation, industry and competi-
tion.”158 Despite the broad protection provided through the patent sys-
tem, patent owners are not entirely immune from antitrust liability
related to their patents.159 However, the conduct at issue in this Com-
ment—maintaining a proprietary database based on the benefits received
from the exclusivity of patent protection—falls outside the scope of the
typical discussions at the intersection of patent law and antitrust law. This
conduct falls outside the realm of Walker Process fraud on the USPTO160
and outside the realm of sham litigation to enforce an invalid patent.161
155. Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 548 F.3d 1004, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., Image Tech. Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1215 (9th Cir.
1997) (“Clearly the antitrust, copyright and patent laws both overlap and, in certain situa-
tions, seem to conflict. This is not a new revelation.”).
158. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990);
see also, e.g., Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, Dept. of Jus-
tice (1995) (“The intellectual property laws and the antitrust laws share the common pur-
pose of promoting innovation and enhancing consumer welfare.”).
159. See, e.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172
(1965) (holding that obtaining a patent through fraud violates antitrust laws).
160. See id.
161. See generally Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (applying the PRE sham litigation test to patent law).
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As such, a proper analysis of this conduct relies primarily on basic anti-
trust principles.
One scholar has briefly addressed the applicability of antitrust princi-
ples to Myriad’s conduct surrounding its proprietary database.162 As dis-
cussed below, her helpful analysis may underestimate the viability of an
antitrust claim, especially given the unique facts surrounding Myriad’s
conduct in past years.
A. ESTABLISHING MONOPOLIZATION UNDER § 2
OF THE SHERMAN ACT
Under § 2 of the Sherman Act, it is a felony to monopolize or attempt
to monopolize trade between the several States.163 The text of § 2 reads:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopo-
lize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on con-
viction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000
if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprison-
ment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court.164
The term “person,” of course, includes corporations.165 In creating the
§ 2 offenses, Congress chose not to further define the offenses, but in-
stead to leave the development of the law to the courts.166
As articulated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Grinnell Corp.,
the offense of monopolization requires: (1) monopoly power in the rele-
vant market; and (2) “‘the willful acquisition or maintenance of that
power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of
a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.’”167 Monopoli-
zation may exist even if the monopoly was obtained through lawful
means, such as through a patent right.168
To receive damages for a § 2 violation, a plaintiff must also show anti-
trust injury.169 Regarding equitable relief, if an antitrust violation is es-
tablished, a court may order compulsory licensing of a patented
product.170
162. Evans, supra note 34, at 58–64.
163. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
164. Id.
165. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61 (1911).
166. See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 454 (1993) (noting that the
legislative history of the Sherman Act indicated that “much of the interpretation of the
necessarily broad principles of the Act was to be left for the courts in particular cases”).
167. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407
(2004) (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966)).
168. See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948) (noting that “the use of
monopoly power, however lawfully acquired, to foreclose competition, to gain a competi-
tive advantage, or to destroy a competitor, is unlawful”).
169. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1438–39 (2013).
170. See United States v. Glaxo Grp., Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 64 (1973).
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1. Monopoly Power in the Relevant Market
Monopoly power has been defined as the power to control prices or
exclude competition.171 A company’s sheer size—including clear domi-
nance of a market—is insufficient to constitute a violation of § 2 because
entities “may become monopolists by force of accident.”172 This principle
reflects the congressional history of the Sherman Act, which indicated
that the Sherman Act should not be construed to apply against an entity
“who happens by his skill and energy to command an innocent and legiti-
mate monopoly of a business.”173
In determining whether a party has monopoly power, courts first define
the relevant market, including the relevant product market and the rele-
vant geographic market.174 In defining the relevant product market,
courts look to “the nature of the commercial entities involved and by the
nature of the competition that they face.”175 The relevant geographic
market involves an analysis of “where, within the area of competitive
overlap, the effect of the merger on competition will be direct and imme-
diate.”176 Once the relevant market is defined, courts evaluate the degree
of market power possessed by the entity, looking at the market share and
any actual anticompetitive effects.177 The extent of market share that an
entity controls is an important factor in establishing market power.178 The
Supreme Court has held that an entity has monopoly power when it has
the “power of controlling prices or unreasonably restricting competi-
tion.”179 Possession of market power may be presumed when an entity
possess a predominant share of the market.180 Furthermore, “[w]hen a
product is controlled by one interest, without substitutes available in the
market, there is monopoly power.”181
Myriad would almost certainly be found to possess market power in the
relevant market of breast cancer research in the United States—and po-
171. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). But see
Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 307 (3d Cir. 2007) (requiring both); Full
Draw Productions v. Easton Sports, Inc., 182 F.3d 745, 757 (10th Cir. 1999) (requiring
both).
172. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) (“AL-
COA”). Although a panel of Second Circuit judges handed down the famous ALCOA
decision, the opinion carries the weight of a Supreme Court decision. See LePage’s Inc. v.
3M, 324 F.3d 141, 147–48 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Because four members of the Supreme Court
were disqualified, the Supreme Court was required to apply the provision of the Expedit-
ing Act . . . currently 28 U.S.C. § 2109, to certify the case to the three most senior judges of
the relevant circuit. Under the statute, the decision of that court was ‘final and conclusive,’
thus equating it to a decision of the Supreme Court.”).
173. United States v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 215 (D. Del.
1953) (1956) (quoting 21 CONG. REC. 3151 (1890)).
174. United States v. Phillipsburg Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 360–62 (1970).
175. Id. at 360.
176. Id. at 362.
177. See generally Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
178. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
179. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 389 (1956) (“Du
Pont”).
180. Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 594.
181. Du Pont, 351 U.S. at 394.
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tentially in the world. In Myriad’s case, the relevant market would be at
least the BRCA gene research market. However, because of the signifi-
cant role the BRCA gene plays in breast and ovarian cancer research, a
court may find that the market consists of the entire breast and ovarian
cancer research market.182
2. Willful Maintenance of Monopoly Power
While satisfying the first prong of the § 2 analysis appears simple in
Myriad’s case, establishing the second prong of the § 2 analysis proves to
be more difficult. The existence of monopoly power does not automati-
cally result in a finding of monopolization under the Sherman Act.183 In-
stead, “[t]o safeguard the incentive to innovate,” courts require “an
element of anticompetitive conduct” in addition to possession of monop-
oly power.184 Thus, establishing a § 2 violation also requires proof of “the
willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business
acumen, or historic accident.”185 As discussed below, refusing to deal
with competitors may satisfy this second prong of the § 2 analysis in some
circumstances.186
B. REFUSAL TO DEAL AND THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE
1. Basic Refusal to Deal Principles
Although courts have placed a “high value”187 on a company’s right to
refuse to deal with competitors, the Supreme Court has consistently held
that in some circumstances a refusal to deal with competitors may consti-
tute a § 2 violation.188 The primary case cited for antitrust liability based
on a refusal to deal is Aspen Skiing v. Aspen Highlands Skiing.189 How-
ever, in Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko,190
the Supreme Court significantly narrowed Aspen Skiing by noting that
“Aspen Skiing is at or near the outer boundary of § 2 liability.”191 The
Court characterized Aspen Skiing’s “limited exception” to the right of
refusal to deal as one where “[t]he unilateral termination of a voluntary
(and thus presumably profitable) course of dealing suggested a willingness
182. See id. at 404 (“[The relevant] market is composed of products that have reasona-
ble interchangeability for the purposes for which they are produced—price, use and quali-
ties considered.”).
183. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 406
(2004) (“Trinko”).
184. Id. at 407.
185. Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570–71.
186. See generally Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585
(1985); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Lorain Journal Co. v.
United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
187. Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 601.
188. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408.
189. See generally Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. 585.
190. See generally Trinko, 540 U.S. 398.
191. Id. at 409.
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to forsake short-term profits to achieve an anticompetitive end.”192
Based on this characterization, Dr. Evans concludes that “[a] clinical
laboratory’s refusal to share its [variant of unknown significance] data
would almost never fit in this exception.”193 Although Dr. Evans’s con-
clusion may be correct in most instances, Myriad’s conduct may fit into
this narrow exception. Through November 2004, Myriad voluntarily con-
tributed its genetic mutation data to the Breast Cancer Information Core
(the largest database for BRCA mutation data).194 Interpreting this con-
duct in light of the Court’s language in Trinko indicates that the sudden
“unilateral termination” of such a voluntary dealing may indicate “a will-
ingness to forsake short-term profits to achieve an anticompetitive
end.”195 It will be difficult, however, to demonstrate that Myriad forsook
short-term profits by choosing to keep its data proprietary instead of
sharing the data with the public. Although it appears obvious that Myriad
chose to withhold its data because of its value, a court may find that Myr-
iad’s choice was motivated by “competitive zeal” instead of the required
“anticompetitive malice.”196 If, however, an antitrust plaintiff demon-
strates that Myriad did forsake short-term profits in altering its business
model, or that Myriad based its decision on “anticompetitive malice,”
Myriad’s conduct would likely fit into the narrow Aspen Skiing form of
liability.197
The Supreme Court in Trinko also expressed concern regarding a
court’s ability to administer and supervise a solution to a party’s refusal
to deal with competitors.198 Again, however, considering that Myriad al-
ready possesses an infrastructure for sharing data with the public through
the well-established Breast Cancer Information Core platform, requiring
Myriad to share its data would not require any judicial oversight.199 Thus,
concern with judicial oversight would not factor into the viability of an
antitrust claim in Myriad’s case.
2. The Essential Facilities Doctrine
Even if an antitrust plaintiff could not establish a § 2 violation using the
refusal to deal principles found in Aspen Skiing, liability may inhere
under the essential facilities doctrine. According to this doctrine, a com-
pany who refuses to deal with other companies by refusing to provide
those competitors with access to an essential facility may be liable under
antitrust laws.200 As the Seventh Circuit aptly explained, “[s]uch a refusal
may be unlawful because a monopolist’s control of an essential facility
192. Id.
193. Evans, supra note 34, at 61.
194. Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 15.
195. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409.
196. Id.
197. See id.
198. Id. at 415.
199. See Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 15.
200. MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132 (7th Cir. 1983).
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(sometimes called a ‘bottleneck’) can extend monopoly power from one
stage of production to another, and from one market into another.”201
Myriad’s proprietary database could be characterized as an “essential
facility” to help formulate an antitrust claim against the company’s ac-
tions. To establish liability under the essential facilities doctrine a plaintiff
must prove: “(1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a
competitor’s inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential
facility; (3) the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and (4) the
feasibility of providing the facility.”202 This doctrine can apply to intangi-
ble facilities, such as information.203
The essential facilities doctrine, based loosely on a 1912 Supreme Court
decision,204 has become entrenched in the jurisprudence of circuit courts
across the nation.205 The Supreme Court, however, has expressly noted
that it has neither adopted nor repudiated the doctrine’s existence.206 In-
stead, the Court has emphasized that there are “few existing exceptions
from the proposition that there is no duty to aid competitors.”207 And,
despite the changing composition of the Court over the past few decades,
the Court has yet to become interested in addressing the doctrine’s viabil-
ity.208 The Court has noted, however, that this doctrine should not be
used if a regulatory agency has the power to compel the use of an essen-
tial facility.209 From outside the court system, the essential facilities doc-
trine has faced severe criticism.210 For example, the Department of
Justice in 2008 expressed its view of the doctrine, noting that “[t]he De-
partment agrees that the essential-facilities doctrine is a flawed means of
deciding whether a unilateral, unconditional refusal to deal harms
competition.”211
Nonetheless, this doctrine provides the best opportunity for establish-
ing antitrust liability for Myriad’s maintenance and exclusive use of its
proprietary database. The “essential facility” would, of course, be the
database of genetic information. Under the second prong of the doctrine,
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1132–33.
203. Tri-Tech Mach. Sales, Ltd. v. Artos Eng’g Co., 928 F. Supp. 836, 839 (E.D. Wis.
1996).
204. United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 409–10 (1912).
205. See, e.g., MCI Communications, 708 F.2d at 1132.
206. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 411
(2004) (“We have never recognized such a doctrine . . . and we find no need either to
recognize it or to repudiate it here.”).
207. Id.
208. See, e.g., Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411; Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing
Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 611 n.44 (1985) (“[W]e find it unnecessary to consider the possible
relevance of the ‘essential facilities’ doctrine . . . .”).
209. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411.
210. See Thomas F. Cotter, The Essential Facilities Doctrine, University of Minnesota
Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series Research Paper No. 08-18, at 1, available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1125368.
211. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act 129 (2008), available at www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/reports/
236681.htm.
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it is impracticable for competitors to replicate the vast amount of genetic
data held by Myriad. Thus, an antirust plaintiff should be able to establish
the second prong. If, in the future, Myriad refuses to allow others to util-
ize this database—even if those competitors attempt to pay for the prod-
uct—the third prong of the test will likely be satisfied. Finally,
considering that the genetic information is stored on a searchable com-
puter database, it would be feasible for Myriad to provide access to the
essential facility. Thus, all four prongs of the essential facilities doctrine
would likely be satisfied.
Although Dr. Evans rightly concludes that the essential facilities doc-
trine “aptly describes the situation in the genetic testing industry,” she
further concludes that “[t]he ultimate problem with the essential facilities
doctrine is that it forces courts to act as economic regulators and grapple
with details of pricing and access arrangements that courts are ill
equipped to administer.”212 While courts have recognized this concern in
other contexts,213 courts will not likely be forced to play any significant
role in regulating the operations of these companies. As discussed above,
a court decision requiring Myriad to share its vast mutation database
would require no judicial supervision because Myriad already has mea-
sures in place for sharing data through the Breast Cancer Information
Core.214 Moreover, compulsory data sharing would not require judicial
supervision of similarly-situated companies because the research commu-
nity already maintains public databases for this very purpose.215 Courts
could simply direct the companies to share data through these existing
resources.
Data formatting will not prove to be a problem because, for example,
ClinVar expressly touts its “flexible data model” and lists a variety of data
formats accepted by the public database.216 And even if research compa-
nies utilize inconsistent data formats, courts could instruct the companies
to provide the data in a format consistent with the format used by public
databases. Although this may require a good deal of time and effort on
the part of the company’s computer scientists, it would not require any
degree of judicial supervision. As such, courts are fully equipped to fash-
ion a proper remedy for sharing proprietary data.
C. ANTITRUST INJURY AND DAMAGES
After establishing antitrust liability under the above theories, to re-
ceive damages a plaintiff would also have to prove an antitrust injury and
damages.217 Establishing antitrust injury requires more than a showing of
212. Evans, supra note 34, at 62–63.
213. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 415.
214. Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 15.
215. See, e.g., What is ClinVar?, NCBI, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/clinvar/intro/ (last
updated Aug. 28, 2014).
216. How to Submit Data to ClinVar, NCBI, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/clinvar/docs/
submit/ (last updated Dec. 17, 2014).
217. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1438 (2013).
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injury in fact.218 Rather, a plaintiff must prove that the injury suffered is
“of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flow[s]
from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful.”219
At least some evidence of antitrust injury can be found in an amicus
brief submitted to the Supreme Court in Association of Molecular Pathol-
ogy v. Myriad.220 One health care provider, Kaiser Permanente, claimed
the following:
Kaiser Permanente is barred from obtaining full information about
its own members’ test results. Instead, Myriad offers summaries of
these data upon request and only with a signed release from a clini-
cian. Kaiser Permanente would compile a database of information
learned from the test results of its own members—a next-best alter-
native to accessing the complete Myriad database—but the selective
summary data provided by Myriad do not enable it to do so.221
As such, an antitrust plaintiff would likely be able to establish antitrust
injury based on Myriad’s withholding of its data from health care provid-
ers who would otherwise compile similar sets of data.
VII. OTHER SOLUTIONS TO PREVENT THE
PROPRIETARY DATA HOLD
A. CONGRESSIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
In Mayo, the Supreme Court indicated that Congress should develop
more specific rules regarding diagnostic patents if such important public
policy concerns exist.222 In this vein, some industry leaders have recom-
mended particular legislative action to ameliorate the potential for inac-
cessible VUS data. For example, Susan Domchek, Sean McElligot, and
others at the University of Pennsylvania suggest amending the U.S.
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) to require
data sharing as an aspect of Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amend-
ments (CLIA) certification.223 Congress’s CLIA program “establish[es]
quality standards for all laboratory testing to ensure the accuracy, relia-
bility and timeliness of patient test results.”224 Because any laboratory
that offers diagnostic tests, such as genetic tests, must be CLIA certified,
this could be an effective means for regulating data sharing. Another rec-
ommended solution is for Congress to alter the jurisdiction of the FDA
218. See id.
219. See id. (internal quotations omitted).
220. Brief of Kaiser Permanente as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note
29, at 8.
221. See id.
222. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012)
(referencing the specific statutes tailored to plant patents, the Court noted “we must recog-
nize the role of Congress in crafting more finely tailored rules where necessary”).
223. Baker, supra note 23.
224. How to Obtain a CLIA Certificate, Brochure No. 5, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVICES (Mar. 2006), https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legisla-
tion/CLIA/CLIA_Brochures.html.
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by granting it explicit authority to regulate genetic testing.225 Then, the
FDA could promulgate regulations requiring access to important genetic
mutation data.226 Although one commentator has suggested that such
mandatory disclosure requirements would implicate Fifth Amendment
Takings concerns, such an important discussion is beyond the scope of
this Comment.227
With the advent of next generation sequencing, the FDA is already
considering ways to regulate diagnostic gene testing in the future.228
Next-generation sequencing techniques enable a single genetic test to se-
quence an individual’s entire genome.229 Such tests can “identify
thousands—even millions—of genetic variants” which could be used to
“diagnose or predict an individual’s risk of developing many different
conditions or diseases.”230 Such technology “promise[s] to accelerate
‘personalized’ or ‘precision’ medicine, the tailoring of medical treatment
to the individual characteristics of each patient.”231
B. GRASS ROOTS EFFORTS BY OTHERS IN THE
MEDICAL RESEARCH COMMUNITY
A handful of researchers are currently attempting to replicate Myriad’s
massive VUS database. For example, Richard Nussbaum of the Univer-
sity of California, San Francisco, invites patients to submit the data from
their test results for use in a public database.232 One of the best-known
examples of a grass roots effort to share genetic data is the Free the Data
movement, organized by Genetic Alliance.233 Genetic Alliance is a non-
profit organization made up of over 10,000 health organizations.234 The
Free the Data movement encourages individuals to submit the results
from their genetic tests to a publicly-accessible database, ClinVar, which
is maintained by the National Institute of Health.235 The ClinVar
database “aggregates information about genomic variation and its rela-
tionship to human health.”236 On Free the Data’s homepage, the organi-
225. See Baker, supra note 23.
226. See id.
227. Noonan, supra note 129.
228. Preliminary Discussion Paper, Optimizing FDA’s Regulatory Oversight of Next






232. Baker, supra note 23.
233. See generally FREE THE DATA, http://www.free-the-data.org/ (last visited Mar. 2,
2015).
234. Genetic Alliance, FREE THE DATA, http://www.free-the-data.org/who (last visited
Mar. 2, 2015).
235. Sharing Genetic Testing Reports Through Free the Data: Frequently Asked Ques-
tions, FREE THE DATA, http://www.free-the-data.org/learn/reports (last visited Mar. 2,
2015); see ClinVar, NCBI, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/clinvar (last updated Aug. 28,
2014).
236. ClinVar, supra note 235.
564 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68
zation proudly lists eight laboratories that already share BRCA1 and
BRCA2 mutation data through the ClinVar platform.237
Although efforts such as Free the Data may take years to replicate the
vast database a company is able to create during its period as the exclu-
sive provider of a particular genetic test, these efforts will at least shorten
the period of time that a company will be able to keep its valuable data as
a trade secret.238 This will especially become the case if individual pa-
tients become comfortable with providing their test results to a public
database immediately upon receiving their results.
C. INDUSTRY PRESSURE AND PUBLIC PERCEPTION
The benefits of data sharing within the scientific research community
extend beyond the realm of genetic testing.239 For example, a recent Na-
ture Biotechnology editorial noted the need for such crowdsourced data
in the field of drug repurposing (using test data from failed drug com-
pounds to identify new uses for those compounds).240 The editorial iden-
tifies two crowdsourcing initiatives that exist to facilitate shared data and
ideas regarding ways in which failed drug compounds could be repur-
posed for other beneficial therapeutic uses.241 So far, eight companies
have joined the effort to share such important data with other researchers
in their industry.242 If similar efforts become commonplace within the
medical research community, a company such as Myriad could be pres-
sured into sharing its data based on industry expectations.
In other industries, data sharing is becoming common—even trendy, in
an entrepreneurial sort of way. In June 2014, Tesla CEO Elon Musk took
the first step toward opening up the electric vehicle market to competi-
tors by releasing Tesla’s vast collection of patents to the public, with a
promise to refrain from enforcing the company’s patents against infring-
ers.243 Following Tesla’s lead, Toyota announced at the Consumer Elec-
tronics Show earlier this year that it would make 5,680 of its patents
available for public use.244 Many of the patented technologies provide the
237. See supra note 233 (listing Ambry Genetics, Counsyl, Emory Genetics Laboratory
(data shared through EmVClass), GeneDX, Invitae, Michigan Medical Genetics Lab
(coming soon), Pathway Genomics, and University of Chicago’s Genetic Services
Laboratory).
238. See supra Part III.
239. See Editorial, Bring Out Your Dead, Nature Biotechnology (Jan. 9, 2015), http://
www.nature.com/nbt/journal/v33/n1/full/nbt.3123.html?WT.mc_id=TWT_NatureBiotech





243. Elon Musk, All Our Patent Are Belong To You, TESLA BLOG (June 12, 2014),
http://www.teslamotors.com/blog/all-our-patent-are-belong-you (“Tesla will not initiate
patent lawsuits against anyone who, in good faith, wants to use our technology.”).
244. Charles Riley, Toyota is Giving Away its Fuel Cell Patents, CNN MONEY (Jan. 5,
2015, 10:59 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/01/05/autos/toyota-fuel-cell-patents.
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foundation for Toyota’s new hydrogen fuel cell car, the Toyota Mirai.245
These data sharing efforts by large companies encourage research and
development at the community level. Moreover, the willingness to share
data, seemingly for the public good, facilitates positive public relations
efforts. If such efforts become the norm among major companies—each
company joining the cause to promote the public welfare by sharing re-
search data—companies such as Myriad will be forced to choose between
either sharing data or battling a constant public relations nightmare.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The patent system continues to serve the important purpose of promot-
ing innovation by rewarding those who bear the initial research and de-
velopment costs by providing them with a period of market exclusivity.
Yet, this helpful system brings about new issues in an era where the infor-
mation obtained from patented technologies, such as the genetic se-
quences of millions of “variants of unknown significance” obtained
through use of a patented genetic testing method, becomes more valuable
than the patented invention itself. With the continuing advent of next
generation sequencing, the need for shared access to data regarding vari-
ants of unknown significance—in all areas of genetic research—will only
increase.246
When Tesla announced its willingness to share its patents on its electric
vehicle technology, the company emphasized its original purpose: “Tesla
Motors was created to accelerate the advent of sustainable transport. If
we clear a path to the creation of compelling electric vehicles, but then
lay intellectual property landmines behind us to inhibit others, we are
acting in a manner contrary to that goal.”247 Even if the potential legal
avenues of relief discussed above prove futile in addressing the proprie-
tary data dilemma, hope remains that Myriad and other similarly-situated
industry leaders will voluntarily choose to forego potential profits offered
by proprietary datasets and instead focus on promoting the public good
by accelerating advances in medical research through access to shared
data.
245. Id.
246. Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 15 (noting that “the biggest challenge to [whole
genome analysis] implementation is properly interpreting the variants found upon analyz-
ing any individual’s genome”).
247. Musk, supra note 243.
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